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On May 11, 2013, Pakistan went to the ballot 
box. In general, the Pakistani people and the 
latest caretaker government in Islamabad can 
be congratulated for two things. First, the 
election commission was able to pull-off the 
tremendous task off carrying out General 
Elections. Second, for the remarkable voter 
turnout of around 60%! Large shares of the 
Pakistani people defied the risks of going to 
the polling stations – this is a clear indication 
that the Pakistani people fully appreciated the 
importance of these elections and wanted to 
have their vote cast. The fact that several 
hundreds of people lost their lives or were 
injured in insurgent attacks during the election 
period underscores the extraordinarily 
threatening situation of exercising their 
democratic right of taking part in the country’s 
politics. These two big achievements have 
made the 2013 elections one of the most 
important events in the recent political history 
of the country.  
 
However, the elections are also remarkable 
regarding the actual outcomes and their 
implications for democracy, peace and 
stability in Pakistan and beyond. If one 
believes the domestic media, the country was 
very close to a major shift in the political 
landscape, especially regarding a potential 
transition in the political leadership was 
persistently evoked. This found its most 
visible expression in the media’s hyping of 
Imran Khan and his political party Pakistan 
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Being able to stage 
gatherings with more than 100.000 spectators 
during his electoral campaigning, especially in 
order to attract the new and urbanized youth, 
most of the press did not miss the opportunity 
to pick up Khan’s buzzword of creating a 
‘political Tsunami’ which would lead to new 
faces and fresh impetus in Pakistan’s politics. 
But it appears that there was no such 
landslide transformation, at least not easily 
recognizable at the first sight. Khans and his 
PTI made a lot of social and political noise 
and found the traction they wanted within the 
elections’ coverage. Nevertheless, since the 
elections are over now and daily life has 
returned to the realities on the ground one 
can’t help but feel that much of this Imran 
Khan hype found its roots in wishful thinking. 
This is even more significant after 
acknowledging that his “dream of change” 
was not shared by the general public. It was 
more about the hopes of a part of the 
country’s urban and educated youth, which of 
course is an important and influential section, 
but not one that can single-handedly change 
the outcomes of the elections. It goes without 
a doubt that many representatives of the 
modern English-speaking- media jeopardized 
their objectivity by losing the appropriate and 
professional distance to Imran Khan and his 
party. Perhaps this was partly encouraged by 
foreign media, which was also affected by the 
‘Imran Khan fever’, as well as Pakistani 
journalists, who overestimated Khan’s 
capabilities to induce change. There is no 
doubt that his chances to gain power in 
Islamabad and the provinces were blown out 
of proportion. The results of the elections 
crushed this (dis)illusion.  
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Khan neither turned into the strongest political 
force on the national level, nor was he able to 
play an important role as a junior partner or a 
‘kingmaker’. He was also not able to win an 
absolute majority in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province (KPK) and he suffered a defeat in 
Lahore, which was especially painful since 
Khan was hoping to turn this urban centre 
into his stronghold. Lahore was also 
supposed to send a signal towards his major 
political rival on the ballot boxes Nawaz Sharif 
and his PML-N.  
 
Because of the ‘Imran Khan fever’ many 
Pakistani’s and especially the international 
observers started to see him as the next 
Prime Minister. Therefore, the election results 
were interpreted as a defeat of Khan and his 
PTI. However, in this context one clearly has 
to state that it is a total distortion of facts if 
one speaks about a defeat. The fact that 
Khan was only able to win one seat in 2002 
and the PTI was not represented in the 13th 
National Assembly (2008-2013) and now won 
35 seats is a remarkable success. If he is 
now able to form a successful coalition in 
KPK under his leadership he can use that 
province as a model and prove that he is 
really able to deliver, and is not just a product 
of the media. In fact, relatively speaking the 
PTI was the biggest winner of the 2013 
election. Whereas the PML-N more than 
doubled its representation in the National 
Assembly, the PTI went from 0 in the 2008 
Elections to 35 seats in the most recent one.  
 
 
Regardless, at the end of the day following 
assessment can be made: after a more 
critical analysis of Khan’s electoral promises 
and political statements one must recognize 
that there is no big difference between Khan 
and the ‘condemned’ old political 
establishment. An impression which found its 
resonance within the electorate which was 
not persuaded by the surreal sounding pledge 
of eliminating corruption within 90 days, or 
creating jobs for the huge masses of 
unemployed youth. Though the issues of 
drone attacks and Pakistan’s relationship with 
the USA are perceived as important, it turned 
out that they reflected concerns of people in 
certain regions of the country more than 
those of the Pakistani public at large. Besides 
the people in the respective areas which are 
affected by drone attacks - and in which PTI 
was relatively successful, the masses are 
more interested in socio-economic issues of 
daily life. In this context, one should mention 
that it was helpful that the US tried to be as 
‘invisible’ as possible and restrained itself 
from siding with a certain political party. An 
example for this strategy is that US Secretary 
of State John Kerry skipped a visit to Pakistan 
in March to avoid accusations of any 










However, the good performances of regional 
parties promoting local issues made clear that 
compared with 2008, this year’s elections 
were not influenced by emotional voting 
behaviour and most Pakistanis made their 
decision based on rational indicators. 
Obviously Pakistani voters are keen to be 
governed by a government which is finally 
able to deal with Pakistan’s domestic 
problems on the ground instead of getting 
distracted by ‘high politics’ dealing with the 
so-called national concerns as defined by the 
military’s security paradigm. 
 
Having this in mind, the most remarkable 
outcome of the elections was the political 
return and the outstanding victory of Nawaz 
Sharif and his PML-N. However, it did not 
really come as a surprise. Generally one can 
state that his campaign was a smart 
combination of several factors:  
 
First, the drawing on the record of the PML-
N’s comparably good governance in Punjab, 
which was actually an achievement of 
Nawaz’s brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief 
Minister in Pakistan’s largest and dominating 
province.  
 
Second, a professional campaign with a 
successful use of the ‘political coalition 
opportunities’ offered by the country’s political 
system especially its electoral system ‘The-
First-Past-The-Post’. Here one has to state 
that due to a detailed analysis of potential 
‘eligible candidates’, meaning the 
identification of people with the highest 
chances to win their constituency, and the 
ability to get their support (partly through party 
defection), Nawaz was able to secure many 
seats. Initially it seemed that Imran Khan 
seemed to have substantial success in 
coaxing eligible candidates from PML-N camp 
to join the PTI. However, in the end Nawaz 
managed to prevent this process and 
consolidated their allegiance to the PML-N. 
 
Third, Nawaz focused strictly on economic 
themes or on topics related to improving the 
socio-economic conditions of the Pakistani 
people. He was able to present himself during 
the electoral campaign as a politician who 
was not solely representing the interest of the 
establishment, especially his own. 
Subsequently, he was able to achieve an 
inroad into the broader, economically less 
fortunate sections of the Pakistani society. In 
this direction, it appeared that Khan was 
perceived by the common Pakistani on the 
country side as too aloof and most likely 
politically as too new and inexperienced. The 
masses once again chose an old and known 
force and were not interested in a political 
adventure promising ground breaking 
changes but not offering clear ideas on how 
they would be implemented.  
 
Last but not least Nawaz Sharif was able to 
convince Pakistani voters that he changed 
fundamentally. He managed to persuade the 
public that he would act more responsibly and 
professionally than he did in the 1990s where 
he displayed severe autocratic tendencies 
which often resulted in conflict with all other 
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noteworthy political forces. In brief he 
managed to transform himself from an exiled 
“persona non grata” into an ‘eligible person’ 
able to win a clear majority on the national 
level. 
 
However, Nawaz must now show that he can 
deliver. He might have learned his lessons 
from his first two failed attempts to tackle the 
problems of Pakistan. It seems that the 
resistance against any autocratic rule, military 
or civilian, is increasing. Nawaz might be able 
to get along this time with the army which will 
continue to have a stake in all important 
decision-making processes. It will most likely 
be helpful to Nawaz Sharif to coin the 
rapprochement with India as the major theme 
in his foreign policy. A direction which is also 
in line with the army’s top brass which 
realized that they don’t necessarily have to be 
friends with India but have to normalize their 
relationship in order to boost the country’s 
trade and economy. But even more than the 
argument of the power of the purse seems 
the increasing conviction that Pakistan’s 
armed forces are not able to deal with the 
double burden of competing with India at its 
border (in maintaining high troop levels there) 
and at the same time struggling with the 
Taliban in its border region to Afghanistan. 
Besides the fact that Nawaz Sharif signalled 
that he is willing to talk with the Taliban, the 
military is keen to continue its struggle. This 
will most likely be the first litmus test for the 
new government in its relationship with the 
army. When it comes to Afghanistan, at least 
during the electoral campaign it seemed that 
Nawaz is quite ambivalent in this direction. 
He will most likely follow the line of the army 
and will not be very interested in getting too 
involved in this conundrum.   
 
Talking about the potential relations of the 
next government with the other branches of 
state and agencies, one should not leave out 
Pakistan’s increasingly independent and 
sometimes stubborn judiciary. At the moment 
it appears that Sharif will most likely not get in 
trouble with the country’s leading judges. 
Since current chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry will retire this year and the next 
most senior judges are also close to the 
retirement age, this might be an indication for 
the reluctance within the judiciary to continue 
its confrontation with the executive, at least in 
the next one and a half years. Furthermore, it 
might also be possible that the judiciary and 
the new government under Nawaz Sharif are 
on the same page regarding critical issues. 
They will share the same antipathy towards 
Pervez Musharraf who is or will soon face 
several charges. Nawaz Sharif will obviously 
not share the sympathies of the military 
towards its former Chief of Army Staff. 
Additionally, and more importantly, they will 










Nevertheless, even Nawaz Sharif strictly 
follows his business mantra and continues to 
maintain a soft approach towards the Taliban 
in order to prevent provoking them. These 
fundamentalists will remain the greatest threat 
for any peaceful, stable and democratic 
future. Undoubtedly, the election-related 
violence caused by the Taliban was one of 
the major challenges during the last weeks of 
campaigning as well as on the actual day of 
casting the ballots. Since it hampered the 
active right to vote, the passive suffrage 
(standing up in the elections as a candidate), 
as well as freedom of speech and opinion 
since especially secular politicians, their 
political parties and supporters were in the 
focus of the fundamentalists, Taliban activities 
led to serious defects in Pakistan’s emerging 
democracy. In this context one clearly has to 
state the fact that Nawaz Sharif and Imran 
Khan were largely spared from terrorist 
attacks, creates the false impression that 
there is room to manoeuvre for Pakistan’s 
political forces in dealing with the Taliban.   
 
Actually, the Taliban’s strategy is pretty simple 
and crystal clear: to reject of any kind of 
democratic governance because it is 
perceived as an adversary to the basic 
precepts of Islam and in contrast with Sharia 
law. Therefore, since the democratic path is 
no option for the Taliban the pseudo 
distinction between the good and bad Taliban 
remains pointless. There is only one type of 
Taliban, deeply anti-systemic and anti-
democratic in nature as well as fundamentally 
against the constitution of Pakistan. 
Furthermore, is does not look like the Taliban 
have any interest in negotiations with a 
Pakistani government. Therefore, in order to 
improve the quality of democracy in Pakistan 
as well as to create stability in the country, not 
only social and economic prosperity is 
paramount, but also a robust approach 
against the Taliban is needed.  
 
